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T H E O H E R M A N S 
Translation s Representations 
ι 
In 1966 the German hermeneuticist Hans-Georg Gadamer published 
an essay entitled 'Man and Language', an essay which, appropriately, in 
view of its grand title, begins and ends with issues of translation. In it, 
Gadamer takes up Aristotle's classic definition of man as a being endowed 
with 'logos'.1 But rather than the usual rendering which defines man as a 
'rational being', translating 'logos' as 'reason' or 'thought', Gadamer prefers 
to understand, and therefore to translate, 'logos' as 'language'. Man is not 
only a rational being but also, even primarily, a language animal. Gadamer's 
point is that man's distinguishing feature consists in the capacity to com­
municate beyond the sphere of the immediately given, for example by refer­
ring to general or abstract concepts, or to the future. Other animals are 
incapable of such reference. Through language man can make manifest that 
which is not immediately present to the senses. This allows complex social 
organisation and culture, so that 'logos' will eventually extend into notions 
like 'concept' and 'law'. 
Hermeneutics and, with it, translation, are now just around the corner. 
To the extent that language facilitates human interaction and fixes forms 
of cultural expression more or less permanently, it requires interpretation, 
time and again. This is precisely what hermeneutics does: it interprets and 
explains texts. The operation takes place in the first instance within a given 
tradition, when the accidents of time and change have erected obstacles to 
the transmission of linguistic meaning in texts that have come to look dis­
tant, alien, hard to understand. Crucially, the process involves a form of 
translation. How it works in practice within one and the same linguistic and 
cultural tradition is illustrated in the opening chapter of George Steiner's 
After Babel. The chapter, which deals with the kind of deciphering required 
in making sense of the language of English writers from Shakespeare to 
Noel Coward, is suitably entitled 'Understanding as Translation'.2 
Once we have reached this point, the point where we understand 'under­
standing' as 'translation', we can broaden our scope. In fact we can broad-
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en it so much that it is hard to see where the end might be. Translation 
then very nearly becomes the human condition. Every act of understand­
ing involves an act of translation of one kind or another. This is a point 
made by several contemporary philosophers, from Jacques Derrida to Donald 
Davidson, but also by ethnographers like Edmund Leach, who observed in 
1973 that social and cultural anthropologists trying to understand other cul­
tures 'have come to see that the essential problem is one of translation.'3 
However, I should like to stay with Gadamer just a little longer. 
Hermeneutics may initially have envisaged its endeavours as taking place 
within one and the same cultural and linguistic tradition, but to the extent 
that its general thrust, its 'general problem of making what is alien our own' 
resembles the structure of translation/1 it is certainly not confined to mono­
lingual operations. The alien appears alien to us because it is, to all intents 
and purposes, part of an alien world, a foreign language. Let me quote 
Gadamer again, speaking about hermeneutics as the transmission, the 
'trans-lation', of lost or inaccessible meaning, and invoking the origin of the 
term itself: 
As the art of conveying what is said in a foreign language to the under­
standing of another person, hermeneutics is not without reason named 
after Hermes, the interpreter of the divine message to mankind. If we 
recall the origin of the name hermeneutics, it becomes clear that we 
are dealing here with a language event, with a translation from one 
language to another, and therefore with the relation of two languages.5 
What becomes clear from this is that the model of hermeneutics is trans­
lation, in its conventional sense, as translation between languages. The gods 
speak a language different from ours, therefore Hermes has to mediate and 
interpret between them and us. But human communities too speak in mutual­
ly unintelligible tongues. In the end it does not really matter whether we 
think of this unintelligibility as extending diachronically within one linguis­
tic and cultural tradition, with language change erecting the barrier over 
time, or as being spread, synchronically, over a certain geographical space, 
with different languages being spoken side by side. Man may be a language 
animal, but he is never a language animal in a general or abstract sense. 
Each of us always inhabits a specific language, in a given spatio-temporal 
setting. More than that: unless we find ways of overcoming the limits of the 
language we inhabit, we remain imprisoned in it. Hermeneutics, like trans­
lation, offers us a way out of our own language, and opens up others. 
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The shadow that falls over a statement like this is, of course, that of 
Babel, of the multiplicity and confusion of tongues. Babel obliged, even con­
demned us to translate, but rendered translation problematical at the same 
time. It is entirely appropriate, as indeed Derrida has exquisitely reminded 
us, that 'Babel' itself is a word that defies translation, being both a prop­
er name —and therefore as singular and untranslatable as a signature — 
and a common noun, and as a common noun it means, precisely, 'confu­
sion'.6 If understanding is translation, surely Babel confounds not only the 
translator but the hermeneuticist as well. 
However, hermeneutics is not really my main concern here. I have 
brought it in merely because I want to retrieve from the hermeneutic endeav­
our two aspects which seem to me to be of particular relevance to transla­
tion, or at least to translation as we have traditionally perceived and con­
ceptualized it. The first is that of cultural transmission and retrieval across 
time and space, the second that of interpretation as making intelligible to 
others by means of words that they understand, by representing that which 
is incomprehensible in a comprehensible manner. 
The first aspect, transmission and retrieval, points to the translator as 
enabler, as one who provides access by removing or overcoming barriers, by 
leading across the chasms that prevent understanding. The second, making 
intelligible, indicates how the enabling and the provision of access is to be 
achieved: by offering a mirror image of that which itself remains beyond 
reach, by presenting a replica, a reproduction, a representation. From these 
two aspects we can derive the standard metaphors of translation. The first 
aspect generates the metaphor of translation as building bridges, as ferry­
ing or carrying across, as transfer, 'trans-latio', 'meta-phor'. The second 
appeals to translation as resemblance, as likeness, as imitation, as mime­
sis, not of the world of extra-linguistic phenomena but of another text, an­
other entity of a linguistic order. 
The two metaphors are connected, because the trust that we, on this 
side of the language barrier, place in the translator as mediator and enabler 
depends on the quality, or the presumed quality, of the translation as like­
ness, as resemblance, as a truthful portrait. A translation may be a derived 
product, a mere copy, it may be secondary and therefore second-best, but 
because we trust the translator's integrity, professionalism and good faith 
we assume that the replica is 'as good as' the real thing. The last thing we 
want to do is to put our money on a forger or a counterfeiter. 
Yet — and here is the turning point— it seems to me that this is exactly 
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what we are doing when we go along with the standard view of translation 
as it is captured in the metaphors I have been dishing up. The rather smooth, 
unruffled picture of translation that I have just painted is one way of re­
presenting 'translation'. It is part of the conventional perception and self-
presentation of translation, but it papers over the cracks. In what follows I 
want to try and poke my finger into one or two of these cracks, to make 
them larger, more visible. One reason for doing so lies in the recognition 
that translation, for all its presumed secondariness, derives its force from 
the fact that it is still our only answer to, and our only escape from, Babel. 
Another arises from the consideration that the cracks, and the way we deal 
with them, are extremely revealing in themselves. What I want to focus on, 
then, are, firstly, some paradoxical and problematical aspects of the way in 
which translations 'represent' other texts; secondly, what translation can re­
present for us, as students of translation; and thirdly, the problematics of our 
representations of translation — especially other concepts of translation. 
2 
Let me return for a moment to what I called the self-presentation of 
translation as it appears in innocuous metaphors tucked away in statements 
like: 'Speaking through an interpreter, President Yeltsin declared that...'. 
What does it mean: 'speaking through an interpreter'? Or take a variant: 
we all blithely claim that we have read Dostoyevsky, Dante, Ibsen, Kafka, 
Kundera, etc. Hardly anyone, I trust, has read all of these in the original 
language. We have read some or most of them in translation. To the extent 
that the translations successfully manage to produce, or to project, a sense 
of equivalence, a sense of transparency and trustworthiness which entitles 
them to function as full-scale representations and hence as reliable substi­
tutes for their source texts, statements like Ί have read Dostoyevsky' etc. 
are a legitimate shorthand for saying Ί have actually read a translation of 
Dostoyevsky' — which then amounts to saying 'and this is practically as 
good as reading the original'. But note: only to the extent that a 'sense' of 
equivalence, of equality in practical use value, has been produced. And we 
tend to believe that this 'sense' of equivalence results from the very trans­
parency of the translation as resemblance. A translation, we tend to say, is 
at its most successful when its being a translation goes unnoticed, i.e. when 
it manages not to remind us that it is a translation. A translation most co­
incides with its original when it is most transparent, when it approximates 
pure resemblance. 
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This requires that the translator's labour be, as it were, negated, or sub­
limated, that all traces of the translator's intervention in the text be erased. 
The irony is that those traces, those words, are all we have, they are all we 
have access to on this side of the language barrier. Yeltsin may well speak 
right 'through' an interpreter, but all we have to make sense of are the inter­
preter's words. Nevertheless we say that Yeltsin declared so-and-so, that 
we have read Dostoyevsky. Even though it is precisely this presumed authori­
tative originary voice that is absent, we casually declare it is the only one 
that presents itself to us. 
We feel entitled to be casual about this because we construe transla­
tion as a form of delegated speech, a kind of speaking by proxy. This implies 
not only a consonance of voices, but also a hierarchical relationship between 
them, and a clear ethical —often even a legal— imperative, that of the 
translator's non-interference. The imperative has been formulated as the 
'honest spokesperson' or the 'true interpreter' norm,' which calls on the 
translator simply and accurately to re-state the original, the whole original 
and nothing but the original. In this view the model of translation is direct 
quotation: nothing omitted, nothing added, nothing changed — except, of 
course, the language. 
The moment we stop to think about this, we realize we are entertain­
ing a massive illusion, for the obvious reason that a translation can never 
coincide or double up with its source. Languages and cultures are not sym­
metrical or isomorphic systems. For every instance of consonance, however 
measured, there is also dissonance, and hence the likelihood of mismatch, 
of manipulation and misuse. Not only the language changes with transla­
tion; so does the context, the moment, the intent, the function, the entire 
connnunicative situation. Moreover, since the translator's intervention in this 
process cannot simply be neutralized or erased without trace, we shall have 
to come to terms with the way translation superimposes and intermingles 
the various voices that make up its re-enunciation.8 This intermingling sug­
gests it is difference and therefore opaqueness and untidiness that are 
inscribed in the operations of translation, not coincidence or transparency 
or equivalence in any formal sense. Speaking of translation in terms of 
equivalence means engaging in an elaborate — if perhaps a socially neces­
sary— act of make-believe. 
I should like to dwell for a moment on this question of the translator's 
supposed non-interference, which tends to require the translator's invisi­
bility in the translated text. My point is that translated texts - like other 
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texts, but more emphatically, transculturally so - are always plural, un-
stable, de-centred, hybrid. The 'extra' voice, the translator's voice, is always 
there. But because of the way we have conventionally construed translation 
in terms of transparency and consonance, we prefer, we even require this 
voice to remain totally discreet. In practice many translations try hard to 
comply with this requirement. Sometimes, however, translations run into 
what we might call 'performative self-contradiction, i.e. moments where 
they can be seen to contradict their own performance. The resulting in-
congruities that open up in the text are due to the fact that, while we gene-
rally accept that translated texts are reoriented towards a different type of 
reader in a different linguistic and cultural environment, we expect the 
agent, and hence the voice, that effected this reorientation to remain so 
discreet as to vanish altogether. That is not always possible, and then the 
translation may be caught blatantly contradicting its own performance. If 
we can demonstrate the translator's discursive presence in those cases, we 
can and should postulate a translator's voice, however indistinct, in all trans-
lations. 
Let me illustrate the point with a single, utterly obvious example.9 It 
bears on what Roman Jakobson would call the metalinguistic function of 
language; in this particular instance Derrida speaks of language 're-mark-
ing' itself in a text which emphatically declares that it is in a certain lan-
guage. In translation this causes problems, as indeed Derrida has shown in 
his discussion of the final chapter of Descartes' Discours de la méthode. 
There Descartes says, in French, that he has written his book not in Latin 
but in French, and why. The Latin translation of the Discours omits this 
embarrassing sentence, to avoid the self-contradiction of a statement declar-
ing, in Latin, that it is not in Latin but in French. Derrida regards this as 
an instance of institutional untranslatability, which is a perfectly valid 
observation, as indeed in the Latin version the sentence was not translat-
ed.10 For readers of the Latin version, however, the omission is not imme-
diately detectable (unless they compare the Latin text with the French) 
because the statement is simply not there. In translations into languages 
other than Latin, where the sentence is translated, the self-contradiction 
may be less glaring, but it is still obvious enough. The Penguin version, for 
example, has: 'And if I write in French ... rather than in Latin ... it is 
because ...'.H Now, the anomaly of reading an English text which declares, 
in English, that it is actually in French challenges the reader's willing sus-
pension of disbelief. It creates a credibility gap which readers can over-
come only be reminding themselves that this is, of course, a translation. But 
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in so doing the reader also realizes that the voice producing the statement 
cannot possibly belong to Descartes, or to Descartes only. There is, clear­
ly, another voice at work, a voice we are not meant to hear, which echoes 
and mimes the first voice, but never fully coincides with it. And that other 
voice is there in the text itself, in every word of it. 
Derrida himself has exploited this paradox of translation more than 
once in his own writings, on occasion even openly challenging his transla­
tors to find solutions to his insistent wordplay. Clearly, such solutions as are 
found are so charged with irony that they cannot be read without the aware­
ness that the text contains another, intermittently audible voice that can­
not conceivably be reduced to Derrida's. In all these cases we can ask: 
whose words are we in fact reading? Exactly who is speaking? And if we 
are dealing with more voices than one, where do we locate them? 
3 
What is at stake in cases like these, however, is more than a matter of 
plural, unstable, de-centred voices. The question of voice points to a much 
broader issue, that of the standard perception of translation as transparency 
and as duplication, as not only consonant but as coinciding with its origi­
nal. It requires that translators too become transparent, that they spirit 
themselves away in the interests of the original's integrity and status. Only 
the translator who operates with completely self-effacing discretion and de­
ference can be trusted not to violate the original. The loyal self-abnegation 
of the one guarantees the undisputed primacy of the other. 
Historically the hierarchical positioning of originals versus translations 
has been expressed in terms of a number of stereotyped oppositions such 
as those between creative versus derivative work, primary versus secondary, 
unique versus repeatable, art versus craft, authority versus obedience, free­
dom versus constraint, speaking in one's own name versus speaking for 
someone else. In each instance, of course, it is translation which is cir­
cumscribed, subordinated, contained, controlled. And in case we should 
imagine that these are after all natural and necessary hierarchies, it will 
be useful to remember that our culture has often construed gender distinc­
tions in terms of strikingly similar oppositions of creative versus reproduc­
tive, original versus derivative, active versus passive, dominant versus sub­
servient. The point here is not just that the historical discourse on transla­
tion is sexist in casting translation in the role of maidservant or of faithful 
and obedient wife, but that translation has been hedged in by means of 
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hierarchies strongly reminiscent of those employed to maintain sexual power 
relations. 
There is more. In the last twenty years or so, literary theory has empha­
sized the role of the reader in investing texts with meaning, and high­
lighted the role of convention and the play of intertextuality in the pro­
duction of texts that are but variations on existing patterns and texts. As 
a result, we have come to appreciate, on the one hand, the inexhaustibility 
and irfepressibility of meaning and, on the other, the various mechanisms 
by means of which our culture has nevertheless attempted to control this 
proliferation of meaning. In Michel Foucault's essay 'What is an Author?', 
the concept of the 'author function' is posited as the ideological figure that 
our culture has devised to keep the potentially unbounded circulation of 
meaning within bounds.12 We do this primarily by insisting on the author 
as a single unifying subject, with a single voice, behind the text. We thus 
suppress the more uncontrollable aspects of texts, their loose ends, their 
unintended or unattributable semantics, their plurality and heterogeneity. 
But translation constantly pushes in precisely this direction, the direction 
that the 'author function' was designed to block.13 Translations dramati­
cally compound and intensify the refractory increase in voices and mean­
ings, they simultaneously displace and transform texts, and fix interpre­
tations which, as verbal artefacts, are themselves open to interpretation 
even as they claim to speak for their originals. It is not hard to see, then, 
that if our culture has needed an 'author function' to circumscribe the 
semantic potential and plurality of texts, it is not hard to see why it has 
also, emphatically, created what we might call a 'translator function' in an 
effort to contain the exponential increase in signification and plurivocali-
ty which translation brings about. 
As an ideological and historical construct, the 'translator function' serves 
to keep translation in a safe place, firmly locked in a hierarchical order. 
The metaphors and oppositions through which we traditionally define trans­
lation, the expectations and attitudes we bring to translated texts, the legal 
constraints under which translation is made to operate, all accord with this 
function. And so we say we read Dostoyevsky, or Descartes. Just as we com­
monly accept that the most reliable translation is an 'authorized' transla­
tion, the one formally approved and legally endorsed by the author. The 
term itself confirms the singularity of intent, the coincidence of voice, the 
illusion of equivalence and, of course, the unmistakable relation of power 
and authority. The translator may author the translated text, but we want 
the author to authorize it. 
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4 
The issue of the 'translator function' can serve to highlight our unease 
at the uncontrollable ways in which translations rewrite, transform, appro­
priate and relocate their source texts. Just how much and what kind of 
attuning and adaptation is permitted or acceptable in practice, will depend 
on prevailing concepts of translation in the host culture and on who has the 
power to impose them. To the extent however that translation is construed 
as re-enunciation, the practice of translation inevitably results in all man­
ner of tensions within the translated text itself. 
This is partly at least because translations cannot help being enmeshed 
in the discursive forms of the recipient culture, including the whole array 
of modes which a culture may have developed to represent anterior and dif­
ferently coded discourses. Translation —like adaptation, pastiche, parody, 
commentary, sequel, remake, plagiarism, formula writing, etc. — constitutes 
one mode of textual recycling among others. The specific and always his­
torically determinate way in which a cultural community construes trans­
lation therefore also determines the way in which translation, as a cultur­
al product, refers to its donor text, the kind of image of the original which 
the translation projects or holds up. In other words, the 'anterior text' to 
which a translation refers is never simply the source text, even though that 
is, of course, the claim which translations commonly make. It is at best an 
image of it — a mirror image perhaps, provided we think of it as an image 
reflected in a kaleidoscopic, distorting mirror. Because the image is always 
slanted, coloured, pre-formed, overdetermined, never innocent, we can say 
that translation constructs or produces or, one step further, 'invents' its orig­
inal.14 
If this is true, then the selection of texts to be translated, the mode that 
is chosen to (re)present or project or invent the source text, the manner in 
which translation generally is circumscribed and regulated at a particular 
historical moment, and the way in which individual translations are 
received, all this tells us a great deal about the cultural community that 
engages in translation. What exactly does it tell us? To my mind, transla­
tion presents a privileged index of cultural self-reference, or, if you prefer, 
self-definition. In reflecting about itself, a culture, or a section of it, tends 
to define its own identity in terms of 'self and 'other', i.e. in relation to 
that which it perceives as different from itself, that which lies outside the 
boundary of its own sphere of operations, outside its own 'system'. Trans­
lation offers a window on cultural self-definition in that it involves not only 
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the selection and importation of cultural goods from the outside world, but 
at the same time, in the same breath as it were, their transformation into 
terms which the recipient culture recognizes, to some extent at least, as its 
own. And because the history of translation leaves in its wake a large num­
ber of dual texts as well as countless re-translations and reworkings of exist­
ing translations, it provides us with a uniquely accessible series of cultur­
al constructions of the 'other', and therefore with privileged, first-hand evi­
dence of the workings of cultural self-definition. 
In this perspective, clearly, resistance or indifference to translation, 
even the absence of translation, can be as informative as the enthusiastic 
pursuit of this or that particular type of translation — and it is important 
to remember that when translation occurs it is always a particular type of 
translation. Translators never 'just translate'. They translate in the context 
of certain conceptions of and expectations about translation. Within this 
context they make choices and take up positions because they have certain 
goals to reach, personal or collective interests to pursue, material and sym­
bolic stakes to defend. Both the context of translation and the actions of 
individuals and groups engaged in translation are socially determined. 
Translators too are social agents. 
In short, where a culture feels the need or sees an opportunity to import 
texts from beyond a language barrier, and to do so by means of translation, 
we can learn a great deal from looking closely at such things as: what is 
selected for translation from the range of potentially available texts, and 
who makes the relevant decisions; who produces the translations, under what 
conditions, for whom, with what effect or impact; what form the transla­
tions take, i.e. what choices have been made in relation to existing expec­
tations and practices; who speaks about translation, in what terms and with 
what authority or legitimacy. 
5 
If we reckon, then, that translation is worth serious and sustained atten­
tion, both on account of the complexity of the phenomenon itself and in 
view of its cultural significance, it is also worth assessing the precise weight 
and import of the concepts that govern this, practice, and exploring its 
modalities and parameters. This involves delving into the question of what 
exactly, in different periods and contexts, is covered by the various terms 
and concepts, the images and metaphors used to conceptualize and locate 
translation. It means, more broadly, investigating not only the practice of 
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translation but also the discourse about translation, i.e. its representation 
by others, by all who speak about translation. 
But here too we run into profound problems and paradoxes. To appre­
ciate their nature and seriousness, we need to turn for a moment to Roman 
Jakobson's short but influential essay 'On Linguistic Aspects of Translation' 
of 1959.15 Here Jakobson famously distinguished between three kinds of 
translation. They were, firstly, 'intralingual translation, or rewording', 
defined as the interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the 
same language; secondly, 'interlingual translation, or translation proper', 
i.e. the interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language; and 
thirdly, 'intersemiotic translation, or transmutation', the interpretation of 
verbal signs by means of nonverbal sign systems. 
Derrida has astutely commented on this tripartite division,16 pointing 
out that if for Jakobson intralingual translation is a form of translation, then 
in the essay itself the term 'rewording' is a translation of the term 'intralin­
gual translation'. In this way the first and the third term in the list are both 
translated intralingually: 'intralingual translation' is rendered as 'reword­
ing', and 'intersemiotic translation' is reworded as 'transmutation'. But in 
the middle term, 'interlingual translation, or translation proper', the word 
'translation' is not reworded or intralingually translated. It is merely repeat­
ed, tautologically restated. This form of translation is translation: 'interlin­
gual translation' is 'translation proper'. The addition of the qualifier 'prop­
er' suggests moreover that the other two are somehow not 'properly' trans­
lation. This, it will be appreciated, undermines the whole exercise of rang­
ing them all three together as so many kinds of translation. 
From there Derrida went on to question the apparent transparency and 
homogeneity of notions like translation, language, etc. I am interested in 
the more pedestrian question why the paradox is there in the first place. 
The answer, it seems to me, lies in the recognition that Jakobson's essay is 
anchored in at least two different fields. As a linguistic or, more properly, 
a semiotic statement, the claim that 'rewording' and 'transmutation' consti­
tute forms of translation, is perfectly acceptable. From the point of view of 
someone professionally engaged in the study of sign systems there is no good 
reason to restrict the study of translational phenomena to interlingual trans­
lation, to the exclusion of intralingual, intersemiotic or for that matter 
intrasemiotic forms. 
But seen from the vantage point of translation as it is commonly under­
stood, or better: as it is socially construed, legitimated, institutionalized and 
transmitted, the move is not permissible because there translation is trans-
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lation proper, and only that. The unease in Jakobson's formulation stems 
from ambivalence and transgression in declaring both that translation prop­
erly understood means interlingual translation only and that translation 
encompasses other, comparable operations not conventionally, or normally, 
covered by the term 'translation'. Looking at the essay from today's van­
tage point, we can also appreciate it both as being part of the self-descrip­
tion and self-reflexiveness of translation, in questioning precisely the 
boundaries of the field and thus engaging in the discussion about what is 
and what is not translation, what falls inside or outside, and as being part 
of an emerging academic discipline of translation studies. 
What the example shows above all, however, is that, like other branch­
es of the human sciences which cannot escape entanglement in the object 
they describe, the discourse about translation, too, - including the acade­
mic discourse, including the present discourse - is obliged to translate con­
cepts and practices of 'translation' into its own terms. And it necessarily 
does so on the basis of a certain concept of translation.17 In thus perform­
ing the very operations it attempts to describe, it is implicated in the self-
description of translation as a cultural construct, a social institution. How­
ever much translation studies today may want, self-consciously, to mark the 
distance between object-level and meta-level and to stress the orientation 
of its scholarly discourse to other discursive series, the complicity is always 
there, and its implications are unnerving. 
6 
In a way, though, this is merely to confirm that our knowledge about 
translation is itself culture-bound. This, of course, we knew all along. It is 
a feature of the humanities. The issue becomes acute as soon as we move 
beyond our immediate horizon, a move hard to avoid when dealing with 
translation. In fact, the problem surfaces whenever we wish to speak about 
'translation' generally, as a transhistorical or transcultural phenomenon, i.e. 
when we attempt to grasp what another culture, whether distant from us in 
time or place, means by whatever terms they use to denote an activity or a 
product that appears to translate as our 'translation' — which implies that 
we translate according to our concept of translation, and into our concept 
of translation. 
If this is the case, then our rendering, our translation of another cul­
ture's concept of 'translation', will definitely not constitute a transparent 
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image. As we saw, translation is never diaphanous, it is never innocent or 
transparent or pure, never without its own distinct or indistinct voices and 
discursive resonances. On the contrary, it transforms and dislocates every­
thing within its grasp. To the extent, then, that our understanding of anoth­
er culture's concept of translation amounts to a translation of that concept, 
it is subject to all the manipulations and distortions, all the blurred and 
untidy pluralization that goes with translation. Moreover, as we also saw, 
the nature and the particular slant of the distortion is itself socially condi­
tioned and hence significant for what it tells us about the individuals and 
the communities performing the translative operation, i.e. about ourselves 
as students of translation. The study of translation continually rebounds on 
our own categories and assumptions, our own modes of conceptualizing and 
translating translation. 
For those of us who take the study of translation seriously, there is no 
easy way out of these predicaments. But we can learn from them. We can 
learn also from parallel cases, for example in ethnography and social 
anthropology. At the beginning I briefly quoted the anthropologist Edmund 
Leach, who recognized that for his discipline 'the essential problem is one 
of translation' and concluded that 'social anthropologists are engaged in 
establishing a methodology for the translation of cultural language.'18 How­
ever, anthropologists have found that this 'methodology for the translation 
of cultural language' is a much more complex and formidable task than it 
may seem. Let me give one (abbreviated) example. Christian missionaries 
who lived for many years among ihe Nuer of the southern Sudan had con­
cluded that the Nuer possessed a concept of 'religious belief basically simi­
lar to, or at least not wholly incompatible with what Christian Westerners 
would understand by 'religious belief. It is not unreasonable to think that 
perhaps the missionaries' assumption of translatability, which assimilated 
the Nuer conceptual world to their own, also facilitated the missionary 
endeavour itself. The observer's agenda may, consciously or unconsciously, 
have affected the observation by suggesting self-fulfilling presuppositions. 
When subsequently an ethnographer like Edward Evans-Pritchard studied 
the Nuer, he emphasized again and again the utter otherness of the Nuer 
concept, the impossibility of reducing it to our terms. What he highlighted 
was untranslatability, i.e. the fundamental, formidable and practically insol­
uble problem of translatability, of interpreting, let alone of rendering, some­
thing which is utterly alien but (hopefully) approachable through patient 
'contextual interpretation', of rendering that in another language and cul­
ture, i.e. in terms that are familiar to us linguistically and culturally, and 
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therefore in terms that are always already tainted by our concepts, our his­
tory, our culture. Rodney Needham's Belief, Language and Experience 
(1972) is an extended and penetrating reflection on the linguistic, anthro­
pological and philosophical issues raised by studies like those of Evans-
Pritchard. It should be compulsory reading for anyone remotely interested 
in translation.19 
We can of course attempt to measure the alien concept against some 
overriding, universal criterion, or one we take to be universal. This is what 
the sociologist Ernest Gellner did when he accused Evans-Pritchard's sym­
pathetic, tentative reading of the Nuer concept of 'belief of being exces­
sively charitable. Gellner's view was that the Nuer concept appeared to be 
simply incoherent or pre-logical, and that we should be prepared to say 
this. Gellner in turn was subsequently pilloried by the anthropologist Talal 
Asad, who accused Gellner of arrogance and reductivism, but also pointed 
to the power relations involved: the Western academic who reckons he is 
able to see through and sort out a set of alien concepts and practices by 
applying a yardstick which is deemed to be universal but turns out to be 
ethnocentric.20 
What can we learn from this? The first thing we can learn is that the 
issue of how to comprehend, interpret and translate concepts belonging to 
distant cultural worlds, distant language-worlds, remains profoundly prob­
lematical and very much open-ended, even among professional ethnogra­
phers. But ethnographers have at least become aware of the kind of issues 
that are involved, and they have begun to address them. As a result, ethnog­
raphy has become markedly more self-reflexive and self-critical, aware of 
its own historicity and its institutional position, of its presuppositions and 
blind spots, of the pitfalls of representation by means of language and trans­
lation. The other thing that those involved in translation studies can learn 
is that we ignore these issues and debates at our peril, because in study­
ing translation we face essentially the same problem when we try to com­
prehend, interpret and translate what other cultures — the Nuer if you like, 
but it could equally well be contemporary Japan, colonial Brazil or medieval 
Spain— mean when they speak of 'translation', or whatever term they use 
that seems to correspond in some way or other to our 'translation'. The care 
and the respect with which Evans-Pritchard mapped the religious vocabu­
lary of the Nuer, and the seriousness and nuance of Needham's intercul­
tural exploration of the concept of belief do not have a counterpart in the 
field of translation studies. Yet there is every reason to assume that if their 
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patient methodology were applied to terms, discourses and practices asso-
ciated with what contemporary English calls 'translation', it would lead to 
better results than the bland assumption that, say, the medieval Dutch 'over-
setten' simply and unequivocally coincides with the modern English verb 
'to translate.' 
The awareness of the pitfalls of representation and the self-reflexive-
ness of 'cultural translation', as some ethnographers and social anthropol-
ogists call it,21 will not make the problems go away. They are probably insol-
uble anyway, and it may be a matter of finding ways of living with them. 
But the anthropological example can guard against a form of rashness that 
ignores its own ethnocentricity and naively, arrogantly, reductively, trans-
lates all translation into Our' translation, instead of patiently, deliberately, 
recursively negotiating the other culture's terrain while simultaneously try-
ing to reconceptualize our own modes of representation through translation. 
Translation studies, as a cross-cultural discipline, needs constantly to 
remind itself that its own mode of operation is one of cross-cultural trans-
lation. 
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Π ε ρ ί λ η ψ η 
Τέο Ε Ρ Μ Α Ν Σ , Oc αναπαραστάσεις, της μετάφρασης 
Α
κολουθώντας τις καθιερωμένες μεταφορές που περιγράφουν τ η μετάφραση 
με ερμηνευτικούς όρους, ως τη μεταβίβαση και ανάκτηση ενός κ α τ ά τα 
άλλα απροσπέλαστου νοήματος, το άρθρο προτείνει να κοιτάξουμε πέρα από 
αυτή τη συμβατική αυτοπαρουσίαση και να επικεντρωθούμε στην υβριδική, 
πλουραλιστική φύση των μεταφρασμένων κειμένων" προτείνει ακόμη να εστιά­
σουμε την προσοχή μας στους προκαθορισμένους αυτοαναφορικούς τρόπους με 
τους οποίους οι μεταφράσεις αναπαριστούν τα κείμενα-πηγές τους. Ό μ ω ς , ε­
φόσον η περιγραφή της μετάφρασης είναι επίσης μια μορφή μετάφρασης της 
μετάφρασης, πρέπει να συμφιλιωθούμε με την υβριδική φύση των δικών μας 
περιγραφών. Από αυτή την άποψη οι Μεταφραστικές Σπουδές θα μπορούσαν 
να διδαχθούν από το παράδειγμα της Εθνογραφίας, όπου η επίγνωση των προ­
βλημάτων της αναπαράστασης της ετερότητας έχει οδηγήσει σε αυτοστοχα-
στικές και αυτοκριτικές πρακτικές. Εαν η μετάφραση καθεαυτή δεν είναι πο­
τέ αθώα, το ίδιο ισχύει και για τις περί αυτήν θεωρήσεις μας. Το άρθρο βα­
σίζεται μερικώς στην εναρκτήρια ομιλία του συγγραφέα με τίτλο «Transla­
tion's Other», η οποία δόθηκε το Μάρτιο του 1996. 
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